I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normalform games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice-in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensiveform games of strategic complementarities turn out-surprisingly-to be a very restrictive class of games.
Introduction
In this paper I define extensive-form games of strategic complementarities, and prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) is a non-empty, complete lattice. This has strong implications; not only does it give a general existence proof, it also allows the use of comparative statics techniques. While this seems to be a promising result, I also show that, in extensive-form games, the assumption of strategic complementarities is-surprisingly-very restrictive.
Equilibria are usually analyzed by means of fixed-point methods. This has not been the case for SPNE. A methodological contribution of this paper is the introduction of a device, the "extended best-response correspondence." with the property that the set of SPNE of a game coincides with the set of fixed points of the extended best-response correspondence. The model of extensive-form games that I use allows time to be continuous, so the extended best-response correspondence can also be used to analyze SPNE of continuous-time games. SPNE exist in finite games. Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) present an example of a game without an SPNE that is a two-stage game with a finite number of players, and where only one player has an infinite strategy space. Hence, existence of SPNE is not guaranteed after a minimal departure from finite games. Proofs of existence of SPNE in non-finite games are provided by Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) for games of almost-perfect information where a public randomization device is present, by Harris (1985a) , Harris (1985b) and Hellwig and Leininger (1987) for games of perfect information; and by Fudenberg and Levine (1983) for classes of games with strong "continuity at infinity" properties.
In this paper I show that the existence of SPNE follows from strategic complementarities; concretely, that the set of SPNE of a game whose normal-form is a game of strategic complementarities, is a non-empty, complete lattice. My results apply to continuous-time games and Games of strategic complementarities were first studied by Topkis (1979) , and introduced into economics by Vives (1990) . Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999) contain a definition of (normal form) complementarities, with up-to-date references. There are many examples of economic models that are games of strategic complements (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , Topkis (1998) , and Vives (1999) ). By now it is fair to say that complementarities in normal-form games is a very useful and common structure. Here I show that, while still very useful, complementarities in dynamic contexts are rare.
To illustrate the problem, consider the game in Figure 1 . This is "Optional Battle of the Sexes." Here, player One chooses first to say Yes or No. If One says No then payoffs are 1 each. If One says Yes then they play a Battle of the Sexes game: they simultaneously choose an element of It is easy to see that Battle of the Sexes (BoS, the simultaneous-move game that follows after One chooses Yes) is a game of strategic complementarities. Player One's best response to Two playing B is to play B and One's response to Two playing O is to play O. So, a change by Two from B to O makes One change in the same direction. This is also true for player Two: a change by One from B to O makes Two change in the same direction. Imposing an order on the players' strategies, we can say that O is "larger" than B. Then the best response of each player is increasing in the other player's choice of strategy, this is the crucial property of a game of strategic complementarities (indeed it is easily seen that BoS satisfies the definition of a game of strategic complementarities in e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ). Now, consider the extensive-form game Optional BoS and let us impose an order on the set No¦ Yes . Let the action "Yes" at One's initial decision node be larger than "No". Then the strategy No-O (say No at the initial node and plan to play O in Battle of the Sexes) is smaller than Yes-O and No-B is smaller than Yes-B. But, when One is playing No-B it is optimal for Two to play O, while if we increase One's strategy to Yes-B then it is uniquely optimal for Two to play B. This implies that Two's strategy is not increasing in One's strategy choice. We could try to fix this by saying that B is larger than O, but then the problem would arise when One increases the strategy from No-O to Yes-O.
It turns out that it is possible to make Optional BoS a game of strategic complementarities.
The solution is to say that the action Yes is smaller than No. This shows that extensive-form games of strategic complementarities are not trivial. 1 But unfortunately the simple solution in Optional BoS is not feasible in general. I shall show how a complication of Optional BoS yields a game that cannot be transformed into a game of strategic complementarities. I shall argue also that most dynamic games of economic interest cannot be transformed into games of strategic complementarities.
The situation contrasts with the study of Markov-Perfect equilibria in stochastic games with complementarities (Curtat (1996) , Amir (1989) and Amir (1996a) ). Markov strategies limit dynamic strategic interactions, and thus allows complementarities to have leverage, but when more general strategies are allowed, this breaks down. I shall illustrate the situation with examples in Section 4. Section 2 presents definitions and notation. Section 3 introduces the extended best-response correspondence and the main results of the paper. Section 4 shows how complementarities are a restrictive assumption by discussing some examples.
Generalized Extensive-Form Games

Basic Definitions and Notation
A detailed discussion of the concepts defined in this subsection is in Topkis (1998 
X be a correspondence. Say that φ is increasing in the strong set order if, whenever x y, φ x is smaller in the strong set order than φ y .
The order-interval topology on a lattice is obtained by taking the closed intervals # x ¦ y$ % z X : x z y as a sub-basis for the closed sets. All lattices in the paper will be endowed with the order-interval topology. All products of partially ordered sets are endowed with the product order. All products of topological spaces are endowed with the product topology. 
Definition of Generalized Extensive-Form Games
I present a definition of extensive-form games that has information sets, as opposed to decision nodes, as primitives. It is really only a slight variation on the usual rules for drawing game trees, but it results in a considerably more general framework because it allows time to be continuous and does not impose perfect recall or partitioned information structures. 2 I hope that the benefits of having results that apply to continuous-time games are important enough to balance the cost of a slightly unfamiliar framework. Besides its generality, this model of extensive-form games is more parsimonious than the usual one, therefore the proofs are easier and sharper than they would be otherwise.
I shall use the following example to illustrate the concepts as they are introduced.
Example 1 Consider the game in Figure 2 . First, player One selects an element in L¦ R . If she selects L then the game "ends" and the payoffs are 2 to player One and 0 to player Two. If she selects R then Two gets to choose between l and r. If he chooses l then she gets 1 while One 
I make two assumptions about T , the collection of "subgames." First, that H itself belongs to this class of subgames: Let α 0 
is also closed under increasing unions. It is easy to verify that the example in Figure 2 satisfies these assumptions, as does any well-defined game tree.
The players choose actions at each of their information sets. For each h H, let A h be the set of actions available to the player that moves at information set h. Each A h is endowed with a Hausdorff topology. The set of all possible actions is denoted by
Note that if A h is a complete lattice for each h, then S i α , St i α and S α are complete lattices in the product order.
Each player is endowed with preferences over strategy profiles in subgame α Consider the game in Example 1:
The strategy space for player 1 for the whole game is S 1
-where LL4 means that 1 plans to play L at her first decision node (a 1 ) and then L4 at her second decision node (a 2 ) and so on. The strategy space for player 2 for the whole
The strategy spaces for the other subgames are S 1
and S 2 α 2 c / 0 . The choice of / 0 for player 2 in subgame α 2 formalizes that only 1 makes a choice in this subgame. The players' preferences in each subgame are immediate from Figure 2 
The payoffs in Example 1 are consistent: Fix the strategy s 2 α 0 l by player 2 in subgame α 0 , the "whole" game. Given any strategy s 1 α 0 , player 1's payoff is independent of choices in node a 2 . In particular, choosing R4 , the dominant strategy in subgame α 2 , does not decrease the payoff to following s 1 α 0 . Now, consider s 2 α 0
r. The only case where the requirement consistency has bite is for the strategy LL4 . In subgame α 0 , LL4 is preferred by 1 to RL4 . But, in subgame α 2 , R4 is better than L4 . Consistency then requires that LR4 be preferred to RL4 in subgame α 0 -which is satisfied by the specified payoffs.
Example 1 illustrates why payoffs in any well-defined game tree are consistent. Given i's strategy s i α and opponents' strategies st i α , if a subgame α4 is not reached then i is indifferent among her choices in this subgame and she cannot do worse by picking something that is better in the subgame. On the other hand, if subgame α4 is reached then payoffs will be given by choices in α4 . Choosing a better strategy in subgame α4 can only improve the payoff to s i α .
The definition of a generalized extensive-form game is complicated enough to warrant an enumeration of its components:
H is a set of information sets; V 
I shall refer to the SPNE in subgame α 0 , the whole game, as simply SPNE. Note that a strategy profile is a SPNE if and only if its restriction to any subgame is a SPNE in that subgame. 
It is slightly cumbersome to show that the game in Figure 1 , has strategic complements. I leave this for section 4.
Examples of Generalized Extensive-Form Games
Optional BoS
I shall present the current notation for the "Optional Battle of the Sexes" game from the introduction. Let a 1 be the initial node, b be the node at which player Two moves and a 2 be One's information set after that Two has moved. Then, H
Action spaces are A a 1 y
Battle of the Sexes in Continuous Time
The game is a Battle of the Sexes played in continuous time. As Anderson (1984) payoffs is similar to that in Radzik and Goldman (2001) in a class of continuous-time zero-sum games.
To avoid problems with the map from strategies to outcomes, I impose that players are only allowed to switch infrequently from one action to the other. Time is indexed by t g # The set of all information sets is H 
The Extended Best-Response Correspondence and Strategic Complementarities
Main Results
In this paper I shall focus on subgame-perfect equilibria. In order to keep track of the best responses to opponents' strategies in each subgame, I need to introduce the set 
which is really the same set as S 1 α 0 , n 1 is an accounting device. In general S i and n i are isomorphic: identify
In the rest of the paper I will frequently identify S and n .
Definition 5 Player i's extended best-response correspondence β i : n " n i is defined by:
The game's extended best-response correspondence is β :
Player i's extended best-response correspondence assigns a strategy that is a best response in each subgame to her opponents' strategy. A game Γ's SPNE can be analyzed by means of its extended best-response correspondence β. Lemma 6 shows the usefulness of the extended best-response construction. By the construction of β, and the definition of SPNE, one can easily see the validity of the following first lemma-so I omit its proof.
Lemma 6
The set of SPNE of a generalized extensive-form game equals the fixed points of its extended best-response correspondence.
The next lemma, Lemma 7, shows that β is not a vacuous construction. The idea behind its proof is simple. Given opponents' strategies s 
. By consistency of payoffs, then, for any α The linearly ordered setΩ was arbitrary. By Zorn's lemma there is a maximal element, say
. By consistency of payoffs, 8 (Zhou (1994) ) Let X be a complete lattice, and φ : X " X a correspondence such that φ x is a non-empty, subcomplete sublattice for all x X . If φ is increasing in the strong set order, then the set of fixed points of φ form a non-empty complete lattice.
Theorem 9 If Γ is an extensive-form game of strategic complementarities, then its SPNE form a non-empty, complete lattice.
Proof: I need to show that β is monotone increasing in the strong set order and takes nonempty, closed values in order to apply Zhou's (1994) version of Tarski's fixed point theorem.
First I show that β is monotone increasing in the strong set order. Let , proving that β is increasing in the strong set order.
That β takes closed values is an immediate consequence of upper semi-continuity of payoffs in each subgame. By Lemma 7, β takes non-empty values. Hence, by Zhou's version of Tarski's fixed point theorem, the set of fixed points of β is a complete lattice. Lemma 6 implies that the set of SPNE is a complete lattice.
Theorem 9 implies that there is a smallest and a largest SPNE of any extensive-form game of strategic complementarities. Note that the subgames of any extensive-form game of strategic complements are also extensive-form games of strategic complements. Therefore, by Theorem 9, each subgame has a smallest and a largest SPNE strategy profile. It turns out that the extremal SPNE of any subgame are obtained from the extremal SPNE of the whole game. This has important consequences: It can be seen that, in multi-stage games, the extremal equilibria are Markov-Perfect. At the same time, for the reasons discussed in Section 4, the scope of Theorem 9 on multi-stage games is very limited-hence I choose not to dwell on the implications of Theorem 9 on multi-stage games here, see Echenique (2000) for the details.
The collection of subgames tively. An argument similar to the proof that the extended best-response function is monotone increasing in the proof of Theorem 9 establishes that, for any p x n , β t I p w is smaller than β tH I p w in the strong set order. The result then follows from Theorem 2.5.2 in Topkis (1998) .
Complementarities are restrictive
How common is the existence of complementarities in extensive-form games? There are two answers to this question. First, one can argue that the order on strategies is not part of the description of a game, so one has a "degree of freedom" in checking for complementarities, one can try to find an order on strategies such that a game has complementarities: So, how often can one find an order on strategies such that a game has complementarities? Very often-I shall not expand on why here, but it is a direct application of the characterization in Echenique (2001); Echenique's (2001) results require, though, that one knows first the number of equilibria of the game, so it does not provide sufficient conditions for existence, or for comparative statics.
Second, given games with some kind of "natural" order for which heuristically one should get complementarities-for example a dynamic variant of a static game with complementaritiesthe answer is negative. In the discussion below I shall give examples of games with and without extensive-form complementarities, I believe these examples explain where the problems arise.
The situation contrasts with the study of Markov-Perfect equilibria in stochastic games with complementarities. For example, Curtat (1996) (implicitly also Amir (1989) and Amir (1996a)) imposes supermodularity conditions on payoffs, and is able to obtain results on the set of Markov-Perfect equilibria using lattice-theoretic tools. The reason is that Markov-Perfect equilibria limit the strategic interaction over time enough so that the effect of complementarities is preserved in dynamic contexts-this will, I hope, be clear from the examples below.
Optional BoS in the introduction is a game of strategic complementarities. Optional
BoS II in Figure 3 cannot be made into a game of strategic complementarities. Say that Yes is larger than No and repeat the argument from the introduction: An increase in One's strategy % A h and a is smaller than a4 , then a is preferred to a4 .
That is, preferences have to coincide with the order on actions for every strategy profile that has h "on its path."
2. I shall show that, even in simple dynamic games, while "per-period payoffs" are supermodular, (extended) best responses are not monotone increasing, there is no largest SPNE, and the set of SPNE is not a lattice. The root of the problem is that the strategic interactions in dynamic games destroy the effect of complementarities in per-period payoffs.
First I present a finite-horizon example. Then I present an infinite-horizon example to show that there are additional problems with dynamic complementarities in infinite-horizon games (I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out that there are additional problems in infinite-horizon games). The point of these examples is that there is no hope of generalizingwith a different notion of extensive-form complementarities-the results in Section 3 to many games of economic interest.
a) The example in item 1 is a dynamic game that intuitively should satisfy definition 4, but fails to do so. Theorems 9, 10 and 12 depend on the property that best responses are monotone increasing, and not directly on the supermodularity/single-crossing assumptions on payoffs in Definition 4-these assumptions are merely sufficient for monotone (extended) best responses, not necessary. I shall show that, even in simple dynamic games, while "per-period payoffs" are supermodular, (extended) best responses are not monotone increasing, there is no largest SPNE, and the set of SPNE is not a lattice.
Consider the matrix game in Figure 4 . It is easy to check that this game has strategic complementarities when each player's strategy set is ordered by α Suppose that they discount per-period payoffs with a discount factor δ ' 1 2. I shall show that best responses in the twice-repeated version of the game are not monotone increasing, that there is no largest SPNE, and that there are non-monotone SPNE outcomes.
Consider the following strategy for Column: "play γ in period 1, play α in period 2 if the outcome in period 1 was γ¦ γ , play β in period 2 if not." A best-response to this strategy by Row is to do the same, i.e. "play γ in period 1, play α in period 2 if the outcome in period 1 was γ¦ γ , play β in period 2 if not." Suppose now that Column increases her strategy to "play γ in period 1, play β in period 2 regardless of the period-1 outcome." Then, any best-response by Row involves playing β in period 1-so no best response to the increase in Column's strategy involves an increase in Row's strategy. Then, even if Definition 4 is hard to satisfy, there is little hope that it can be weakened in a fruitful way, as any such weakening should reasonably imply that the example above is a game with strategic complementarities.
The negative conclusions about complementarities and SPNE contrast with existing results on Markov-Perfect equilibria (Amir 1996a , Curtat 1996 . Curtat's (1996) (1991) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) .
Consider finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma. Let us order the players' actions such that "cooperate" is larger than "defect" for each player-nothing depends on that order, we can change it and get the same result. One-shot prisoner's dilemma has strategic complementarities because best-responses are constant (defect no matter what the opponent does), and thus monotone increasing. One-shot prisoner's dilemma also has a unique equilibrium, which gives us a game with strategic complementarities in each step of the backward-induction process, as the future consequences of any pair of chosen strategies are the same. Strategic complementarities are thus inherited from one step to the next in the backward-induction process (see Amir (1996b) for a discussion in the context of recursive decision problems). , suppose that u i has the single-crossing property for all possible pairs of its arguments. Note that, if choices were simultaneous, this would be a game with strategic complementarities. Now lets look at the backward induction solution to this game. From e.g. Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) results, there is a Nash equilibrium of each second-stage subgame that is monotone increasing in the first-period choices. That is, let It is now easy to see that the induced first-period game may not have complementarities. The problem is that existence of complementarities in period 1 depends on the period-two equilibrium, so static complementarities assumptions are insufficient to guarantee extensiveform complementarities. Definition 4 puts enough structure on across-subgames complementarities so that the induced first-period payoffs do have complementarities. It would be nice to know if there are weaker conditions that guarantee this, but I think it is very unlikely that there are any. Figure 5 : Payoffs to Player One in the game in Figure 2 4. Finally, I will show that the game in Example 1 is a game of strategic complementarities.
Order the actions so that L is larger than R, l is larger than r and L4 is larger that R4 . Consider Notes 1 They are not dominance-solvable, as might be suggested by the discussion above.
2 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for the two usual definitions.
3 Optional BoS II shows that the property of having complementarities is not robust to the addition of an irrelevant move. This is also true about complementarities in normal-form games, so this non-robustness does not cause complementarities to be especially restrictive in extensive-form games. 
